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CURRENT PROBLEMS UNDER THE
SECURITIES ACTS
THE EXPANDING USES OF RULE 106-5
The existence of an implied private right of action under Section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 1
 and Rule 10b-52
 promulgated by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is no longer questioned. 3
 The
issue is not raised in litigation.4
 The question, however, of what parties have
standing to sue under 10(b) is at present in "a state of flux." 5 Further, the
elements necessary to state a right of action are not at present clearly defined.
The purpose of this comment is to examine the case law in this area with a
view to determining the classes of plaintiffs having standing to sue and the
elements necessary to state a cairn under 10b-5.
The language of 101)-5, making unlawful various practices "in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security" can be construed as permitting
an extremely broad range of parties to sue. The SEC has argued that all that
is necessary for a plaintiff to have standing to sue under 10b-5 is a violation
of the Rule resulting in a loss in the value of the stock owned by that plain-
tiff.e The courts have, to this point, avoided this broad construction and, in
1 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1964) provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange—
(a) „ ..
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so regis-
tered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
2
 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1968) [hereinafter referred to as the Rule] provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
3
 In Jordan 13Idg. Corp. v. Doyle, O'Conner & Co., 282 F. Supp. 87 (N.D. Ill. 1967),
the district court refused to grant a defrauded purchaser of securities a 10b-5 right of
action because it believed that Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 was the provi-
sion intended to afford a right of action in the factual situation before the court. This
decision was reversed on appeal, Jordan Bldg. Corp. v. Doyle, O'Conner & Co., 401 F.2d
47 (7th Cir. 1968), the court stating that 10(b) extended protection to both buyers and
sellers. The court of appeals noted that the lower court's decision was contrary to the
rulings of seven federal courts of appeals.
4
 Klein, The Extension Of A Private Remedy To Defrauded Securities Investors
Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 20 U. Miami L. Rev. 81, 89 (1965).
5 Bound Brook Water Co. v. Jaffe, 284 F. Supp. 702, 705 (D.N.J. 1968).
e This argument was advanced by the SEC as amicus curiae in Vine v. Beneficial
Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967).
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response to the usual Federal Rules 12(b) (1) and 12(b) (6) motions, 7 have
in a variety of ways limited liability under 10b-5. This judicial response to
10b-5 has been characterized as "the search for limiting doctrine." 8
 It is
probably more accurately described as the determination of the various rights
of action which the rule implies.
A court in dealing with a 10b-5 claim is not setting limits to an existing
right of action. It is, in each case, asking whether from the language of the
Rule and from the legislative history')
 a right of action may fairly be implied.
It therefore becomes important to consider the legal theories upon which im-
plied statutory rights of action are founded. The main theory supporting the
implied 10b-5 right of action is the statutory-tort theory. 1° This, indeed, was
the theory advanced by the court in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,11 the case
which first recognized a private 10b-5 right of action. A second - theory ad-
vanced in Kardon is based on Section 29(b) of the Act of 1934 and the 1938
amendment to that section. 12
 The court argued that when Congress provided
in section 29(b) that a contract shall be void if made in violation of the Act
or the rules made under the Act, it "almost necessarily implies a remedy.' 13
Also, the 1938 amendment, which sets a statute of limitations, clearly indi-
cates that Congress intended that the original statute implied private rights
of action. This reasoning has been called the most compelling argument for
the implied 10b-5 right of action." It has been pointed out, however, that
under this theory, since the basis of the action is in contract, the right of
action would be limited to parties to the contract, or at most to third party
7
 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (1)—lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter ; 12 (b) (6)—
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
8
 Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 544 (2d Cir. 1967).
° Bound Brook Water Co. v. Jaffe, 284 F. Supp. 702, 708 (D.N.J. 1968).
11
 A. Bromberg, Securities Law: Fraud—SEC Rule lob-5 § 2.4(1) (a), at 30 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as A. Bromberg].
11 69 F. Supp. 512 (F.D. Pa. 1946). The court, in explaining the statutory-tort
theory, quoted Restatement of Torts § 286 (1934) which provides:
The violation of a legislative enactment by doing a prohibited act, or by failing to
do a required act, makes the actor liable for an invasion of an interest of another if:
(a) the intent of the enactment is exclusively or in part to protect an interest of the
other as an individual; and,
(b) the interest invaded is one which the enactment is intended to protect; and,
(c) where the enactment is intended to protect an interest from a particular hazard,
the invasion of the interest results from that hazard; and,
(d) the violation is a legal cause of the invasion, and the other has not so conducted
himself as to disable himself from maintaining an action.
12 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1964) provides in part:
Every contract made in violation of any provision of this chapter or of
any rule of regulation thereunder . . . shall be void . . . Provided, (A) ... (B)
that no contract shall be deemed to be void by reason of this subsection in any
action maintained in reliance upon this subsection, by any person to or for whom
any broker or dealer sells, or from or for whom any broker or dealer purchases
a security in violation of any rule or regulation prescribed pursuant to para-
graph (1) of subsection (c) of section 78o of this title, unless such action is
brought within one year after the discovery that such sale or purchase involves
such violation and within three years after such violation.
The proviso clause was added in 1938. 52 Stat. 1076 (1938) .
13 69 F. Supp. at 514.
14 59 Yale L, J. 1120 (1950).
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beneficiaries." The third rationale advanced to support an implied right of -
action is based upon the congressional policy in enacting the Act of 1934. 16
As has been pointed out, all of these theories relate to congressional intent
and are somewhat intertwined. 17 It would seem that the first two are the
primary theories while the last can be termed only supportive.
I. THE Birnbaum DOCTRINE
Possessed of these theories, the courts, faced with a galaxy of factual
patterns, have been asked in each case to determine whether Rule 10b-5
implies a right of action which may afford relief to the particular plaintiff.
Where the answer is negative it is often said that plaintiff lacks standing to
sue. A variety of distinct reasons underlie the holdings that deny particular
plaintiffs a right of action under the Rule. Most are related to the theories
under which statutory liability is implied. However, there is one requirement
limiting standing to sue which, it can be argued, has been advanced by the
courts for reasons other than a desire to conform to the wording of 10b-5 or
to legislative intent. This requirement, which permeates the case law in the
10b-5 area, is that plaintiff be a purchaser or a seller of securities.
The purchaser-seller requirement, which has acquired such stature that
it is termed a "doctrine," was first articulated in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel
Corp.'s In that case minority shareholders in Newport brought suit deriva-
tively on behalf of the corporation, and as representatives of all other similarly
situated shareholders, against Newport, Wilport Corporation and Feldman,
the former president and chairman of the board of Newport. Feldman had held
40 percent of the common stock of Newport and had been negotiating what
allegedly would have been a profitable merger of Newport with a third cor-
poration. However, Feldman ended the merger negotiations and promptly sold
his holdings in Newport to Wilport at a price per share which was approximately
twice the then market value. Wilport intended to use Newport as a "captive"
source of steel.
Plaintiffs, basing their claim on 10b-5, alleged fraud in Feldman's let-
ter to Newport's shareholders in that he misrepresented the reason for the
suspension of the proposed merger with the third corporation, and further
that the new president of Newport, in a letter sent subsequent to Feldman's
sale of stock, failed to state the price Feldman received or the fact that
Newport was to be used as a "captive" source.
The court of appeals, in upholding the district court's dismissal of
plaintiffs' claim for failure to state a cause of action, held that 10b-5 protects
only the defrauded purchaser or seller." The court reasoned that 10b-5 was
adopted to extend to sellers the protection against fraud or deception which
15 A. Bromberg, supra note 10, § 2.4(1) (b), at 32, citing Brouk v. Managed Funds,
Inc., 286 F.2d 901, 908 (8th Cir. 1961).
16 Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 274 (9th Cir. 1961). The court indicated that to
allow buyers a right of action under 10(b) and 106-5 would effectuate Congress' policy
of providing complete and effective public and private sanctions with respect to the duties
imposed by the securities acts. Cf. Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953).
17 A. Bromberg, supra note 10, § 2.4(1), at 29.
16 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
19 Id. at 464.
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Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act explicitly gave to purchasers. It supported this
contention with an SEC release concerning 10b-5, 2° and by noting that 10b 25
is merely the language of Section 17 (a) of the Securities Act of 1933 21
 with the
words "any person" substituted for the words "the purchaser" and the clause
"in connection with the purchase or sale of any security" substituted for the
clause "upon the purchaser." The court added that Section 16 (b) of the Act of
1934,22
 which gives the corporate issuer or its shareholders derivatively a
right of action against insiders using their position to profit from the purchase
or sale of any equity securities of the issuer, strengthens the conclusion that
Congress did not create section 10(b) to protect shareholders against corpo-
rate mismanagement 23
 Thus, rather than stressing the language of 10b-5, the
court relied upon a release containing a statement of the purpose of the Rule,
and upon other sections of the securities laws.
The doctrine that plaintiff must be a purchaser or a seller has been
criticized as being too narrow and rigid. 24
 Such arguments stress the broad
language of the Rule itself,25
 and urge that the complexity and variety of
securities fraud demand that the Rule be flexible in order that wrongs will be
remedied.28
 A rigid doctrine such as the purchaser-seller requirement, the
argument continues, will allow ingenious wrongdoers to devise means of
evading the law. This argument assumes that 10b-5 is a law which affords
relief to all parties defrauded in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities, and then contends that the purchaser-seller requirement allows the
wrongdoer to avoid legal sanctions against his wrong. The relevant inquiry,
however, is whether the requirement is a defect in the reasoning of Birnbaum,
or whether it arises from section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 themselves.
Under the statutory-tort theory, in order for the defendant to be liable
to the party seeking relief for an invaded interest, the interest invaded must
be one which the statute intended to protect. If the statute was intended to
protect only a limited class the plaintiff must bring himself within that class. 27
This was the principle with which the court in Birnbaum was concerned
when it held that plaintiff must be a purchaser or seller. It is difficult to deter-
20
 The court stated:
Prior to [the Rule's] adoption the only prohibitions against fraud in the
sale or purchase of securities were contained in Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act
. and § 15(c) of the 1934 Act. . .. Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act only made
it unlawful to defraud or deceive purchasers of securities, and Section 15(c) of
the 1934 Act dealt only with fraudulent practices by security brokers or dealers
in over-the-counter markets. No prohibition existed against fraud on a
seller of securities by the purchaser if the latter was not a broker or a dealer.
Consequently, on May 21, 1942 the SEC adopted Rule X-10B-5 to close this
"* * * loophole in the protections against fraud administered by the Commission
by prohibiting individuals or companies from buying securities if they engage in
fraud in their purchase." SEC Release No. 3230, May 21, 1942.
Id. at 463.
21 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1964).
22 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b) (1964).
23 193 F.2d at 464.
24 Leech, Transactions in Corporate Control, 104 U. Pa. L. Rev. 725, 831-35 (1956).
25 Id.
26 Lowenfels, The Demise Of The Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era For Rule 10b-5,
54 Va. L. Rev. 268, 276 (1968).
27 Restatement of Torts § 286(b), supra note 11.
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mine solely from the language of the statute and Rule whether protection
should extend only to purchasers or sellers. It has been pointed out that there
are two methods of construing the words "in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security":
The question is presented whether those words limit the operation
of the section and rule to those 'devices and contrivances' (as defined
in the rule) which operate upon purchasers or sellers of securities, or
whether the section and rule proscribe practices which are injurious
to other persons, not purchasers or sellers, so long as a purchase or
sale of a security is one of the steps in the effectuation of those
practices.28
The court in Birnbaum accepted the former interpretation. The broad con-
notation of the words "in connection with" militates against this interpreta-
tion. However, the court's analysis of the Rule's relation to other securities
provisions and the press release is very convincing that only purchasers or
sellers are within the class intended to be protected, or put another way, that
the interests intended to be protected were the interest which a purchaser
has in acquiring securities and that which a seller has in disposing of them.
If the second of the above mentioned interpretations is accepted there would
be an extremely broad class of plaintiffs with standing to sue and the types of
actions spawned under 10b-5 would be numerous and varied. Though this
result might be desirable it is doubtful whether Congress in enacting 10(b)
or the SEC in promulgating 10b-5 intended to provide such sweeping relief
to injured securities investors.
The purchaser-seller requirement has often been utilized by the courts
to deny a 10b-5 right of action. However, there has been a trend away from
the strict application of the requirement and toward an expanding definition of
a puchaser and a seller."2 Not only the writers but also one district court is
of the opinion that the doctrine will be abandoned." The decline of the
doctrine has been happily traced by some and the possibility of new federal
rights emerging has been explored.31 If the Birnbaum analysis is correct these
would indeed be new federal rights and their origin would be the judiciary
and not the legislature.
Apart from the propriety of the creation of such rights by the courts, 32
there has already been some expansion of the possible implied rights of action
under 10b-5. Three patterns emerge from the case law: derivative actions for
alleged injury to the corporation; derivative or corporate actions brought to
halt a control shift or a scheme to perpetuate control; actions by share-
holders on their own behalf. Different considerations are involved in each of
the three areas and the requirements for standing to sue under 10b-5 vary in
28 Leech, supra note 24, at 832.
29 Bound Brook Water Co. v. Jaffe, 284 F. Supp. 702, 708 (D.N.J. 1968).
so Entel v. Allen, 270 F. Supp. 60, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
81 Lowenf els, supra note 26, at 275-77.
82 If the new rights are needed, it is perhaps preferable that they be supplied by
the Congress. However, doubt has been expressed as to the probability of any such action
absent great public clamor. A. Bromberg, supra note 10, § 12.9, at 286.
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relation to the particular problems with which the courts are faced in each
area.
II. DERIVATIVE ACTIONS
As the courts expressly recognize, the gist of the complaints in this area
is some form of corporate mismanagement or breach of fiduciary duty. In
Birnbaum the court stated that lob-5 was not directed at "fraudulent mis-
management of corporate affairs." 33
 The court in Pettit v. American Stock
Exch." rejected the defendant's argument as based on that holding. In that case
the corporate reorganization trustees of Swan-Finch Oil Corporation (Swan)
brought a derivative action in which it was alleged that various banks, stock
brokers and dealers, a corporate insider, Birre11, who owned a controlling interest
in Swan, and others had conspired to defraud Swan by causing it to issue a
large number of shares for valueless consideration. These shares, under the
control of Birrell, were then sold to the public and Birrell and his co-
conspirators pocketed the proceeds of these sales. In denying defendants'
motions to dismiss, the court rejected defendants' "effort to characterize the
trustees' claim as one of 'corporate mismanagement,'"35
 stressing that both
the corporation and the various investors were injured. The court thus felt
that to deny the claim would be to ignore what Congress intended: "the pro-
tection of the integrity of stock transactions."" Moreover, the scheme
defrauded the corporation of a substantial asset, a large number of its shares,
by causing it to issue its stock. Citing Hooper v. Mountain States Sec.
Corp.," the court indicated that when a corporation issues shares there is a
sale and a corporation injured by fraud in connection with that sale clearly
has a valid lob-5 claim. It can be argued that the court was willing to grant
a right of action in Pettit because of the massive proportions of the Birrell
conspiracy and the practical difficulties which would accompany any effort
to prosecute a lawsuit on behalf of the scattered class of injured investors,
each of whose potential recovery is limited. Similarly, the corporation has
other ways to seek relief but, as the court noted, the procedural and juris-
dictional difficulties might well have frustrated effective recovery." Although
the court indicated that these considerations were not essential to its decision,
it is likely that they played an important role therein.
In Pettit the motive behind the fraud was purely monetary. In O'Neill v.
Maytag," the motive of the defendant directors, although in the last analysis
it may have been monetary, was primarily a desire to eliminate a threat to
33
 Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied,
343 U.S. 956 (1952).
34
 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
35
 Id. at 26.
38 Id. at 28.
27
 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961). In Hooper, the
corporation was fraudulently caused to issue its stock for "spurious assets." The court
granted a I0(b) right of action on the ground that the issuance was a sale and that
damage was caused by this sale since the corporation parted with stock which it could
have used to acquire valuable property.
38
 217 F. Supp. at 27-28.
39 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964).
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their control. In O'Neill, plaintiff, a shareholder in National Airlines, brought
a derivative action on behalf of National against National's directors and Pan
American World Airways. Pan Am and National had exchanged stock, but
pursuant to an order of the Civil Aeronautics Board, which had found the
cross ownership to be against the public interest, they re-exchanged shares.
Plaintiff alleged that in this exchange the shares given up by National were
worth approximately $1,800,000 more than those given by Pan Am. Plaintiff
viewed this as a payment by the directors of National to eliminate a block of
National shares held by Pan Am which threatened the directors' control of
National. The court, in affirming the dismissal of plaintiff's claim by the
district court, reasoned that where the breach of general corporate fiduciary
duty does not involve deception there is no 10b-5 right of action." The court,
by its insistence upon "deception," would appear to require an affirmative
misrepresentation or nondisclosure as opposed to a mere branch of fiduciary
duty.}' Viewed from a different perspective, the underlying economic basis of
O'Neill is that the directors received no "direct or monetarily measurable in-
direct benefit"42 from the transaction. 42 Different problems underlie each of
these considerations. In justification of its holding that absent deception
there is no federal right of action for violation of a fiduciary duty, the court
maintained that such was not the purpose of 10b-5. The court admitted, how-
ever, that there is no reason why a director "may not violate both his com-
mon law duty and the duty imposed by Rule 10b-5," 44 but concluded, quot-
ing Birnbaum, that 10b-5 was aimed at " 'that type of misrepresentation or
fraudulent practice usually associated with the sale or purchase of securities
rather than at fraudulent mismanagement of corporate affairs.' " 45
The considerations underlying the "economic basis" of the denial of a
right of action in O'Neill are of a more practical nature. These, it would seem,
are related to remedial problems. The alleged harm to the corporation was the
unfair exchange. This is monetary injury which could probably be remedied
in the action against Pan Am. But the directors, having received no measur-
able monetary benefit, cannot be forced to give up a monetary profit. Their
40 Id. at 767-68.
41 A. Bromberg, supra note 10, § 2.6(1), at 5D n.135. It has been pointed out that the
plaintiff in O'Neill could have argued deception by omission, i.e., that the directors
deceived the stockholders by concealing the real motive for their transaction, The minority
stockholders could, had they known these facts, have instituted a derivative suit to prevent
the transaction. Thus it could be found that the deception caused the injury to the corpo-
ration. Comment, Shareholders' Derivative Suit to Enforce a Corporate Right of Action
Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 114 U. Pa. L. Rev. 578, 583 (1966). It is arguable that even
if the plaintiff had so pleaded deception the court would have denied a right of action
since its analysis indicates that it was determined to avoid the area of corporate mis-
management even if the mismanagement involved the purchase or sale of securities and
deception by omission. In short, the deception "present in O'Neill is not of the type that
Congress intended to deal with.. .." Id. at 584.
42 A. Bromberg, supra note 10, § 4.7(1), at 84 n.65.
43 The direct monetary benefit from the transaction was received by Pan Am.
Whether plaintiffs stated a right of action against Pan Am was not in issue since Pan
Am, named as a defendant, did not move for dismissal below. O'Neill v. Maytag, 339
F.2d 764, 766 n.2 (2d Cir. 1964).
44 Id. at 768. (Emphasis added.)
48 Id.
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profit was retention of corporate control. Thus, if Pan Am were required to
disgorge its profit the federal court would be faced with the difficult question
of what action to take in regard to the directors of National. In Pettit and
Hooper, on the other hand, this problem did not exist since in those cases the
defendants did receive monetary benefits.
In Hoover v. Allen," the plaintiffs did not mention 10(b) in their com-
plaint, yet the court considered the statute on its own initiative.47 Plaintiffs,
suing derivatively, alleged that various misleading statements to shareholders,
which defendants had caused the corporation to make, reduced the price of
the stock below its true value and thereby induced shareholders to sell to the
corporation. This sale had the effect of increasing defendants' proportionate
ownership and, according to the plaintiffs, was designed to give defendants
control of the corporation. Plaintiffs alleged further that the waste of corpo-
rate assets then perpetrated by the defendants constituted damage to the
corporation. The court viewed the selling shareholders, rather than the corpo-
ration which had purchased at the depressed prices, as the victims of the
fraud,48 and denied a derivative right of action on the ground that control
acquired as part of a fraudulent scheme is not injury to the corporation."
The court recognized four possible levels of injury caused by defendants'
scheme. First, there was injury to the selling shareholders. The court felt
that no derivative action should lie for this injury. Secondly, the power of
the minority shareholders who did not choose to sell was "diluted" as a result
of the scheme. This plainly is not injury to the corporation. The third level
of injury is acquisition of corporate control. The court recognized, correctly it
would seem, that this in itself is not injury to the corporation. The fourth
level of injury, however, which the court discussed, and which indeed had
been pleaded by plaintiffs, was the waste of corporate assets occurring after
control was acquired. Plainly this was injury to the corporation. But the court
was unwilling to ground a 10b-5 right of action on such an injury, for the
reason that it was not proximately caused by the fraudulent acquisition of
contro1. 8° Though admitting that in a "but for" sense the waste was caused
by the acquisition of control, the court reasoned that waste is not the neces-
sary and probable result of the acquisition of control
The importation of a proximate cause requirement into this area might
be explained by a fear on the part of the court of a large influx of federal
claims, were it to allow such an action. Without the proximate cause require-
ment the courts would be faced with a wide variety of federal claims each
time corporate control was attained by means of action or inaction in viola-
tion of 10b-5. All injuries to the corporation occurring after the acquisition of
control could conceivably give rise to a federal claim since all injuries in a
"but for" sense would have been made possible by the acquisition of control.
It is at least arguable that such a situation is not objectionable, as it would
appear to further the federal policy of exposure and prevention of fraud in
46 241 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
47 Id. at 226 n.7.
48 Id. at 227.
40 Id. at 228.5° Id. at 229.
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the securities field. If this development is not desirable, however, it would seem
that there is less reason for restraint by the courts where the fraudulent acqui-
sition of control is part of a conspiracy. Indeed, the court, in noting that there
was not such an allegation in plaintiffs' complaint, intimated that, had there
been, plaintiffs might have had a right of action." In such a situation it is
arguable that the proof to which plaintiffs would be put in order to establish
the scheme or plan would insure that the injuries alleged would not be remote
in time or events from the fraudulent takeover. It could be argued also that if
a scheme to gain control of the corporation in order to loot it of its assets were
alleged, the resulting waste would be the necessary and probable result of the
acquisition of control.
That a fear of remote damages and a great influx of federal claims was
behind the court's decision is also evidenced by its interpretation of O'Neill.
The court was of the view that, had a fraudulent scheme been adequately
pleaded in O'Neill, plaintiff there would have had a right of action." In dis-
tinguishing O'Neill the court pointed out that there the injuries existed inde-
pendent of the acquisition of control, whereas in Hoover the corporate waste
flowed from the acquisition of control. If the corporation sustains injury
directly, as where it is induced to purchase its own shares at a price higher
than their true value, this direct monetary injury might serve as the basis
for a 10b-5 derivative action.
Strong doubt has been cast upon the validity of O'Neill's requirement
that the corporation must be deceived. In Entel v. Allen" the essence of the
complaint was that insiders had violated a duty to the corporation and its
shareholders. The directors of Atlas, which had owned Northeast Airlines,
were allegedly strong-armed by Hughes, who owned "Toolco" and 10 percent
of Atlas, into selling Northeast to "Toolco" for inadequate consideration. Plain-
tiffs alleged further that the sale was not at arm's length. Suing on their own
behalf and on behalf of Atlas, shareholders in Atlas alleged that Hughes,
acting in his own interest, breached his fiduciary duty to Atlas in causing the
sale for inadequate consideration. 54 The 10(b) action was rejected in two
sentences.'" The court held that plaintiffs probably could not allege in sup-
port of the derivative action that the corporation was deceived in negotiating
the sale, and thus could not meet the requirement of O'Neill. Furthermore,
plaintiffs did not purchase or sell their stock in reliance on misrepresentations
made in connection with Atlas' sale of Northeast. This, however, was not the
end of plaintiffs' case. On re-argument the court reversed itself" because it
was of the view that two recent cases had undermined Birnbaum," and that
the purchaser-seller requirement would probably not be followed when that
issue was next presented to the court of appeals. The court interpreted Brod
51 Id. at 228.
52 Id. at 227-28.
53 270 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
54 Id. at 68.
55 Id. at 64-65.
56 Id. at 70-71.
57 The cases were Brod v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967), and Vine v. Bene-
ficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967). See p. 326
infra.
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v. Perlow,58
 in which a broker had alleged that defendants ordered securi-
ties intending to pay for them only if their market value increased, as holding
that "an undisclosed scheme to breach state contract law is encompassed by
section 10(h) and Rule lOb-5." 5° From this proposition the court reasoned
that it must follow that an undisclosed scheme to breach state fiduciary law
must be covered by 10(b) and 10b-5." The court in Entel has thus, on the
basis of its interpretation of Brod, dispensed with the requirement that the
corporation be deceived a1
It is questionable whether the Brod reasoning should be applied in the
derivative area. The Brod rationale, if confined to the factual situation pre-
sented in that case, would have little impact on state law or on the number
of federal 10(b) and 10b-5 claims. In addition, the considerations in the
broker-client area are not nearly as complex as decisions in the corporate
mismanagement area. Thus, merely to import the Brod reasoning into the
derivative area is to make possible a wide range of federal claims in the
corporate mismanagement area, without a consideration of the problems
involved.
Pappas v. Moss, 62
 decided recently by the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, represents another probe into the area of corporate mismanagement.
The injured party was the corporation and a 10b-5 action was brought by
shareholders suing derivatively for the corporation against its directors. The
directors, by a unanimous resolution of the board, had authorized the issuance
of 100,000 shares to themselves and a few outsiders, not named in the action,
for a price allegedly far below the true value of the stock. The resolution con-
tained two misrepresentations.63
 The court was of the opinion that where, as
in this case, it is alleged that directors cause the corporation to sell its stock
at a fraudulently low price, a 10b-5 violation is validly stated. More impor-
tantly, however, the court answered defendants' argument that there had been
no deception by "viewing this fraud as though the 'independent' stockholders
were standing in the place of the defrauded corporate entity at the time the
original resolution authorizing the stock sales was passed."'"
As concepts of standing to sue under 10b-5 are expanded, it should be
58
 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967).
66
 270 F. Supp. at 70.
60 Id.
61 The court in Entel found that the corporation had not been deceived. Id. at 69.
Vet it granted a derivative right of action, seemingly in express contradiction of O'Neill's
deception requirement. As has been noted, when the board of a corporation engages in
misconduct, "a shareholder is permitted to_bring a suit on behalf of the corporation. The
hoard then is no longer the focus of the corporate entity for these purposes; the share-
holder represents the effective decision making power of the corporation." Comment, supra
note 41, at 582-83. Therefore, when the decision making power shifts, deception of
the shareholders is arguably causative of the alleged injury. Id. at 583. Thus, a scheme to
breach state fiduciary law, undisclosed to the shareholders, is causative of the corporate
injury. Despite the soundness of such arguments, however, and despite the broad language
of the Rule, it can still be convincingly argued that the interest invaded in cases such as
Entel is simply not an interest which Congress intended to protect.
62 393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968).
63
 Id, at 869,
64 Id.
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noted that possible conflicts with state Iaw may arise. Apart from advantages
related to proving the substantive elements of a 10b-5 claim, 65
 there are
distinct procedural advantages offered to plaintiffs in derivative actions in
the federal courts. The jurisdiction and venue provisions of Section 27 66
 of the
Act of 1934 are very broad and alleviate many problems arising in this regard
where suit is brought pursuant to state law. There are other state procedural
matters which may hamper a derivative action brought under state law, such
as the requirement that plaintiff must have exhausted his remedies within
the corporation. Plaintiff must, in a federal action, comply with Federal Rule
23.1, but its requirements are not as demanding as certain state require-
ments.67
 Several state statutes also require the posting of a security bond for
the corporation's expenses of defending the action." In addition, a plaintiff
in a state action may be faced with a short statute of limitations." Rule 10b-5,
on the other hand, does not require the posting of a security bond," and does
not provide for a statute of limitations. Although under lOb-5 the applicable
statute of limitations is that of the state in which the federal court sits,"
since a federal right is being asserted the federal court will look to the more
liberal federal law to determine the date of the accrual of the action, and will
then apply the time period of the state statute of limitations. 72
It has been urged in support of a limiting interpretation of 10b-5 that
the purpose of Congress in enacting the securities laws was not to create a
separate body of federal law controlling the internal management of corpo-
rations. Even if such federal law were desirable, it is felt that it would be
65 It has been pointed out that plaintiffs in securities actions under state law have
found it difficult to prove such elements as scienter, causation and justifiable reliance, and
that "non disclosure cases have rarely been actionable" A. Bromberg, supra note 10,
§ 2.7(1), at 55 (1968). It has been stated further that the Blue Sky laws "rarely have
the punch of 10b-5," id. § 2.7(2), at 57, and that in enacting securities legislation Congress
plainly intended that "injured investors have an easier time." Id. § 2.7(1), at 55.
69 U.S.C. § 78aa (1964) provides in part:
Any suit or action to enforce any liability or duty created by this chapter or
rules and regulations thereunder, or to enjoin any violation of such chapter or
rules and regulations, may be brought in any such district [wherein any act or
transaction constituting a violation has occurred] or in the district wherein the
defendant is found or is an inhabitant or transacts business, and process in such
cases may be served in any other district of which the defendant is an inhabitant
or wherever the defendant may be found.
97 Lowenfels, Rule 10b-5 and the Stockholder's Derivative Action, 18 Vand. L. Rev.
893, 902 (1965). The Federal Rule in question, 23(b), was amended in 1966 and is now
Federal Rule 23.1, under which the federal requirements remain substantially the same.
68 E.g., N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 627 (McKinney 1963).
69 E.g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 260, § 2A (1959).
7 ° McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 939 (1961), makes it clear that state limitations on derivative actions will not
hinder federal derivative actions under 10b-5. The question before the court was whether
plaintiff need post security for expenses as required by state law. The court held in the
negative. Regarding state claims before a federal court under pendant jurisdiction, a
state's requirement of security for expenses must be followed. Kane v. Central Am. Mining
& Oil, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
71 Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 205 (5th Cir. 1960).
72 Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 783-84 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879
(1965). The advantages under federal procedure are outlined and discussed in Lowenfels,
supra note 67.
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better accomplished by a well planned legislative scheme rather than by
"piecemeal judicial lawmaking."'" Be that as it may, the clear judicial trend
is toward regulation of internal corporate affairs if they involve transactions
in securities. If plaintiffs are suing in a derivative capacity it is, of course, not
necessary that they have purchased or sold securities, but rather it is suffi-
cient that the corporation was involved in a -securities transaction. The issuance
of its own shares, a re-exchanging of shares with another corporation, or a
direct sale of securities will each satisfy the requirement of Birnbaum. It
would seem, further, that O'Neill's requirement of deception will not stand as
a bar to actions in this area. If the alleged injury arises in direct connection
with a sale, as where, for example, the corporation receives inadequate con-
sideration for shares sold by it, the courts will probably grant a right of
action. If the injury is more remote, as where it is only made possible by
control fraudulently attained, no right of action will be granted unless the
plaintiff can allege a plan or scheme to bring about the alleged injury. Al-
though regulation of internal corporate affairs by the federal courts was prob-
ably not foreseen by Congress in enacting section 10(b) or by the SEC in
promulgating Rule 10b-5, the effect will be to further the broad purposes
embodied in the Acts and rules protecting the investing public.
III. SHAREHOLDER ACTIONS To REDRESS INDIVIDUAL IN JURY
Shareholders have also sought to employ 10b-5 for recovery in an in-
dividual capacity. There has been greater success in such action than in the
derivative actions. In Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco Corp., 74 plaintiff
held stock in Old Company which she had purchased in 1945. Deli, a foreign
corporation, owned about 50 percent of the stock of Oki Co. and in 1960, as a
result of a written offer to the shareholders of Old Co., increased its hold-
ings to 90 percent. Plaintiff alleged that the offer was false and misleading
in that, by omissions of material facts and misleading statements, it had
failed to indicate, among other things, that the value of Old Co. shares was
well in excess of the $17.00 per share offered. Having thus acquired 90 per-
cent of the shares of Old Co., Deli incorporated New Company and trans-
ferred all of its Old Co. holdings to New Co. in exchange for all of the stock
of New Co. Following this, Old Co. was merged into New Co. under the Dela-
ware short-form merger statute. 75 Plaintiff brought an action under 10(b) and
10b-5.
The court held, in denying defendants' (Deli, New Co. and Old Co.)
Federal Rule 12 (b) (1) and 12 (b) (6) motions, that plaintiff was entitled to
some sort of relief under 10b-5. Defendants, of course, had argued that plaintiff
was neither a purchaser nor a seller" and thus was not entitled to a 10b-5 right
of action. In response to this argument the court stated that it need neither
affirm nor reject this rule in view of its holding that plaintiff was a seller. The
73 63 Colum. L. Rev. 934 (1963).
74 241 F. Supp. 369 (D. Del. 1965).
75 Under a short-form merger statute a corporation owning 90 or 95% of the stock
of another corporation may merge the latter into itself by vote of its board of directors.
E.g., N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 905(a) (McKinney 1963) ; (95% ownership required).
76 Plaintiff brought suit as the owner of Old Company shares. She had not tendered
pursuant to defendant's tender offer.
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twisting logic employed for this result progresses as follows: (1) Section 3(a)
(14) of the Act of 1934" indicates that "sell" or "sale" includes any contract
to sell; (2) Delaware corporation law is a part of corporate charters granted
by Delaware; (3) a charter is a contract between the shareholder and the cor-
poration; (4) when plaintiff purchased her shares in Old Co. she agreed, by
virtue of the Delaware corporation law, that if the company should ever merge
she would surrender her stock for cash or securities which the merger agreement
specified; (5) the frauds alleged here were related to the fixing of the cash to
be paid per share; (6) this price is a part of the contract to sell impliedly
existing between plaintiff and Old Co.; (7) thus, the fraud was "in connection
with the purchase or sale [here a contract to sell] of any security!" 78 The
reasoning is logically constructed. But is the logic consistent with legislative
intent? If the Birnbaum analysis is correct then plaintiff was neither a pur-
chaser nor a seller within the intended meanings of the words. In Voege, the
court has inferred a right of action from the words of the securities laws, but
it has ignored the SEC press release and the similarity of 10h-5 with section
17(a).
An examination of the manner in which the court satisfied the require-
ment that plaintiff must allege reliance on the alleged violation," which
requirement the court felt obliged to follow, will illustrate the disconnected
reasoning of the court. The court stated that "[i] t may fairly be inferred,
however, that when plaintiff purchased her shares she did rely upon the
honesty and fair dealing of New [Old?] Company and those who controlled
it."" Every contract, the court continued, has an implied condition of good
faith and plaintiff necessarily relied on this condition. Employing like reason-
ing, the court satisfied the "deception" requirement of O'Neill by finding that
"[p]laintiff at bar was the subject of deception for when she acquired her
stock she did so upon the justifiable assumption that any merger would deal
with her fairly . . ."81
The court thus gave plaintiff a right of action under section 10(b) and
10b-5 not because she was deceived by or relied upon defendant's offer but
rather because when she purchased her shares she relied and was deceived.
The rationale of the reliance and deception requirements, furthermore, was
ignored by the court. These requirements are employed to insure that the
alleged misrepresentations, omissions and devices induced action and thus
caused injury to plaintiff. Thus, the court should have looked to whether
the alleged violations caused the shareholders of Old Co. to sell. If it so found
then it could have concluded that this result caused injury to plaintiff and,
on this basis, could have granted plaintiff a right of action. On the other hand,
the court could have refused to take this last step and held instead that only
where the prohibited activity induces action on the part of plaintiff does it
77 15 U.S.C. 78c(a) (14) (1964) provides that "itlhe terms 'sale' and 'sell' each
include any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of."
78 241 F. Supp. at 373-74.
78 This requirement was articulated in List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965), and, as recognized by the court, seeks to insure
that the violation alleged caused injury to plaintiff. -
80 241 F. Supp. at 375.
87 Id.
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impinge upon the interest in fair dealing in the purchase or sale of securities
which was intended to be protected by the statute and the rule.
Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co.,-'6
 is on "all fours" with Voege." Avoiding
the involved logic of V oege, the court in Vine held that as a result of a short-
form merger plaintiff was a forced seller, since he eventually must become a
party to a sale. 84
 The court expressed a willingness to construe the words of
the Act of 1934 liberally, emphasizing that the terms "buy" and "purchase"
include "any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire" and that the
terms "sell" or "sale" include "any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of"
to support its argument that plaintiff was a seller. 85 Defendant argued that
the deception did not relate to plaintiff but to the shareholders who sold their
interest in the corporation. In this regard, the court stressed the fact that the
deception was part of a single scheme and that the fraud perpetrated on
the selling shareholders was "in connection with" the forced sale of plaintiff's
interest. The court held that plaintiff need not show that he relied, since
the injury to him occurred absent any volitional act on his part. "What must
be shown," said the court, "is that there was deception which misled Class A
[selling] stockholders and that this was in fact the cause of plaintiff's claimed
injury."" This view is, as least, a proper application of the reliance and
deception requirements, in that the court looked to see if the fraud alleged
misled the selling shareholders. Though the court finds plaintiff to be a seller,
it is arguable that the court has actually interpreted the words "in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security" as indicating that the rule "pro-
scribes practices which are injurious to other persons, not purchasers or
sellers, so long as a purchase or sale of a security is one of the steps in the
effectuation of those practices." 87 It should be noted that the strict causation
requirement set forth in Hoover is apparently abandoned, probably because
here the consequences of employing a "but for," or as the court phrases it a
"were it not for" test are not as far reaching as would be the case in the
derivative area.
The broad definitions of purchase and sale were again stressed in Fidelis
Corp. v. Litton Indus., Inc., 88 where it was held that the individual plaintiffs
were purchasers entitled to sue under 10(b) and 10b-5. Litton had entered
into an acquisition agreement with Fidelis whereby Litton was to acquire all
of the assets of Fidelis and in exchange therefor was to issue initial shares of
Litton stock up to $360,000 in value and an additional amount of stock,
which amount would depend upon the earnings of the Fidelis assets. Share-
holders of Fidelis could elect to receive a portion of the initial or additional
shares. The plaintiffs chose the latter and alleged that no additional stock
82 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
83 Id. at 634.
84 Id. at 634-35.
65 Id, at 634. A broad interpretation of the term "sale" was also applied in Mader
v. Armel, 402 F.2d 158, 160-61 (6th Cir. 1968), where the court held that an exchange of
stock pursuant to a merger is a sale.
86 374 F.2d at 635.
87 See p. 317 supra; Leech, Transactions in Corporate Control, 104 U. Pa. L. Rev.
725, 832 (1956).
88 Current CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. fl 92,273 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 1968).
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had been issued. Plaintiffs alleged further that Litton made false and mis-
leading statements to plaintiffs to induce them to agree to the acquisition
agreement and to elect to take the additional stock. The court had no prob-
lem in denying defendant's contention that the plaintiffs lacked capacity to
sue. If the allegations were true, reasoned the court, then plaintiffs were
injured in reliance on fraudulent representations made to them. The court
held, in addition, that plaintiffs "were deemed to be purchasers,"" since they
had to elect how much stock they would receive from Litton. This conclusion
rests on the determination that the broad language of the securities acts
"indicates a Congressional intent not to limit 'purchase' and 'sale' to tradi-
tional face-to-face commercial transactions.""
An expansive application of 10b-5 has thus resulted from a broad inter-
pretation of the term "purchaser," as the court in Vine gave a broad meaning
to the term "seller." It should be noted, however, that Fidelis can be dis-
tinguished from Voege and Vine in that, in the former, those bringing the
action had themselves been misled by the defendant, whereas in the latter
two actions the plaintiffs had not been misled. The decision in Fidelis is thus
in harmony with the view that 10b-5 protects only those who have been
induced to act by the proscribed practices. It does not support the view that
the Rule protects those who have been injured because others were fraudulently
misled, or the related view that the Rule proscribes practices injurious to non-
purchasers or non-sellers as long "as a purchase or sale of a security is one
of the steps in the effectuation of those practices."H
In Voege, Vine and Fidelis the courts were willing to recognize the con-
nection between the fraud or misrepresentation and an injury to the plaintiff.
It would thus appear that if this nexus exists the courts will give an expansive
view to the purchaser-seller requirement. This conclusion might indicate that
the purchaser-seller requirement is in reality a device to insure that the alleged
violations caused injury to the plaintiff." If such is the case, then in an action
89 Id. at 97,314.
9 ° Id. at 97,315.
91- See p. 317 supra; Leech, supra note 87.
92 As in other areas of the law, if the causal nexus becomes too attenuated, the courts
may deny plaintiff the opportunity to offer his proof of causation. In Sprayregen v. Liv-
ingston Oil Co., Current CCII Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 92,272 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 1968),
several shareholders of Livingston brought an action against that corporation and three
of its directors alleging that the directors, in a speech, greatly overestimated the future
net profits and cash flow of the corporation, and that when the true figures were released
about two months later the market price of the stock dropped abruptly. Plaintiffs alleged
that during this period, in reliance on the speech, copies of which had been distributed by
the company to its shareholders, they "purchased and/or failed to sell, the shares of the
corporation's common stock." Id. at 97,310. The court indicated that in order to meet
the "in connection with the purchase or sale" requirement of 10h-5 plaintiff need only be
a purchaser or a seller in reliance upon defendants' misrepresentations. Though noting
the "ambiguous" manner in which plaintiffs pleaded facts to meet this requirement, the
court held that the pleading was sufficient because plaintiffs pleaded in the alternative that
they were sellers, The court commented in this regard that the "mere retention of shares
may not meet the requirements that there at least be a purchase or sale." Id. While this
is not a holding that a non-seller or non-purchaser has no standing to sue, it does
indicate that Birnbaum is probably not yet abandoned at the district court level in the
Second Circuit. It is easy to see that a shareholder who retains his shares in reliance on
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where injunctive relief is sought the requirement can, arguably, be discarded.
Indeed, this much was made clear by the court in Mutual Shares Corp. v.
Genesco, Inc.°3
In Genesco the essence of plaintiffs' claim was corporate mismanagement.
Plaintiffs, shareholders in Kress Corporation, alleged that defendants were
manipulating the market price of Kress by keeping Kress dividends to a
minimum. Defendants' object was,to acquire Kress stock at a reduced price.
The court noted that this was also the situation in Cochran v. Channing
Corp.," where it was held that such activity give a 10b-5 right of action
under subsections (a) and (b) thereof. Although plaintiffs in Cochran had
sold their stock while plaintiffs here had retained theirs, the court was of the
view that where injunctive relief is sought, the fact that plaintiffs retain their
stock is not controlling." An injunction was granted enjoining defendants
from depressing the value of Kress stock. In support of its decision, the court
explained that one purpose of the Act of 1934 and 10b-5 is the prevention
of market manipulation, and that present shareholders were proper parties
to play a role in the enforcement of the Act. Furthermore, the court felt that,
since plaintiffs would be hard pressed to prove damages, injunctive relief
might cure harm suffered by Kress shareholders and prevent future violations.
The courts thus appear willing to allow shareholders to supplement the
efforts of the SEC in the enforcement of the securities laws where the relief
sought is injunctive. In such cases problems involved with the fashioning
of damage remedies vanish. Considerations connected with the requirements
necessary to establish a right to recovery under the statutory tort theory
(causation, reliance and injury) also become less important. In this view
Rule 10b-5 has a dual purpose. It can provide redress to those who have been
injured; and it can be employed by others to insure that injuries will not be
continued. Furthermore, the class of plaintiffs with standing to use the Rule
in this latter capacity is broader than the class which uses the Rule as a
remedial device.
IV. ACTIONS BROUGHT TO HALT A CONTROL SHIFT OR
A SCHEME TO PERPETUATE CONTROL
There have been numerous actions brought by plaintiffs seeking to halt
a variety of plans for control changes. In each of these cases injunctive relief
is sought, and in each the suit is brought either by the corporation or by a
a deliberately over-optimistic report of corporate affairs might very well have sold his
interest and thus might, in a real sense, have been damaged. It is also easy to observe,
however, that both the existence and the amount of damages in such a situation might
be highly speculative. This in itself might be sufficient reason to deny a right of action,
although it is arguable that a plaintiff should at least have the opportunity to attempt to
prove the existence and amount of damages.
93 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967).
94 211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
05
 384 F.2d at 546. It should be noted, however, that the court indicated that
plaintiff must show that the damages were in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities, and that the only purchases and sales here were those between other Kress
shareholders and defendants. The court noted that the causal connection between these
transactions and plaintiffs' injury was slim. Id. at 546.
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shareholder suing derivatively. In Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp.," the court
expressly recognized that it was dealing with possible breaches of fiduciary
duties by the directors of a corporatio'n. Six of the directors, seeking to
perpetuate their control, caused the board to approve the issuance of a large
number of treasury shares, which were to be resold to the defendant president
or voted as he directed. This behavior was alleged to be fraudulent in that the
six directors withheld pertinent information from the board concerning the
issuance. Plaintiffs, suing derivatively, sought an injunction to prevent
the carrying out of the control device. The court granted plaintiffs standing
to sue, and held that the issuance of its own shares by a corporation was a
sale. Analogizing from embezzlement and conflict of interest cases, the court
also concluded that a majority of the board may be held to have defrauded
the corporationf" The court distinguished Birnbaum on the ground that there
the fraudulent statements and omissions were directed not at the corporation
but at the shareholders, and that therefore the corporaton itself had not been
defrauded. It would seem that this analysis could enable a defrauded corpora-
tion or its shareholders, in a derivative action, to state successfully a right of
action in a variety of situations.
Another manner in which plaintiffs have sought to employ I0b-5 is to
halt an impending takeover by means of fraudulent tender offers. Such was
the factual pattern in Moore v. Greatamerica Corp." There Greatamerica, in
its published tender offer to the shareholders of Glidden Corporation, stated
that no change in the management or the business operations of Glidden was
planned. Plaintiff Glidden alleged that this statement was either untrue or
misleading. Defendant argued that Glidden had no standing to sue since it
was neither a buyer nor a seller." The court noted that the statute and the
Rule were intended to protect unwary and inexperienced buyers and sellers.
Commenting that it favored a broad and liberal interpretation of the Act,
the court ruled that the individual shareholders and Glidden had standing
to sue, and enjoined defendants from taking any action in connection with
the tender offer pending a hearing on the merits.
In support of permitting the corporation standing to sue for injunctive
relief it has been suggested that in such suits the matter of deception is ad-
judicated early, and that the corporation's greater awareness of the situation
and its resources will protect the shareholders and aid in the enforcement of the
securities acts."° It is also true, however, that to paralyze a tender offer may
cause irreparable harm to a solicitor who might later prevail on the merits."'
The court's analysis in Moore, however, goes little beyond saying that the
90 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964).
07 Id. at 29. These analogies have been criticized as improper, since in neither the
embezzlement nor the conflict of interest cases, is there a requirement that anyone be
deceived. Comment, supra note 41, at 582.
93 274 F. Supp. 490 (ND. Ohio 1967).
99 Defendant also argued that since neither of the plaintiff shareholders made a
tender that neither had standing. Plaintiffs amended the complaint to allege that one
shareholder had made a tender. Id. at 492.
100 81 Harv. L. Rev. 501, 502 (1967).
101 See Comment, Remedies for Private Parties Under Rule 10b-5, 10 B.C. Ind, &
Corn. L. Rev. 337, 353 (1969). See also 81 Harv. L. Rev. 501, 503-06 (1967).
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corporation has standing. Silently, it has given full meaning to the words "in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security." The purchaser-seller
requirement is totally ignored, and there is no discussion of hew the corpora-
tion may be injured. The court apparently passes over these considerations
and allows those in control to demand of those seeking control absolute fair-
ness in the tender offer, possibly for the suggested reasons set out above.
Symington Wayne Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 102 decided in the
Second Circuit, is more demanding of the plaintiffs than the court in Moore.
In Symington, the temporary restraining order sought by the corporation and
two of its shareholders was denied. Plaintiffs alleged various misrepresenta-
tions in a tender offer made by the defendant corporation for shares of the
plaintiff corporation. The misrepresentations alleged by plaintiffs appeared
potentially harmful only to shareholders, as opposed to the corporation. The
court passed over defendant's argument that Symington was neither a pur-
chaser nor a seller,'" and assumed arguendo that all the plaintiffs had standing.
It then denied the temporary restraining order on the grounds that plaintiffs
had failed to establish that they were likely to succeed at trial in proving the
materiality of the misrepresentations, or reliance on the part of tendering
shareholders. Plaintiffs further failed to convince the court that they would
suffer irreparable injury if the injunction were not granted.'" They argued
in this regard that if defendant corporation was successful in its tender offer
it would have the power to block a merger of Symington with another cor-
poration. The court dispensed with this argument by noting that if this power
were achieved by virtue of a 10b-5 violation plaintiffs could seek relief by
asking for an injunction against the voting of the shares.
The latter type of relief was sought in Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v.
D. Kaltman & Co.'° 5
 In that case, defendant brought an action in a state
court seeking to compel the plaintiff corporation, Allied, to call a meeting of
the preferred shareholders to elect new directors.'" Allied sought in federal
court to obtain a stay of the state court proceedings and to obtain an injunc-
tion forbidding the preferred shareholders from voting their stock. The pro-
spective injury which Allied alleged was that Kaltman would lead Allied into
a merger with Kaltman on unfair terms. Plaintiff argued that Kaltman's
open market purchase of Allied's preferred stock and its tender offer consti-
tuted a scheme which would eventually bring about the alleged injury. The
court denied the relief sought on the grounds that federal intervention at
such an early stage would be premature, and, further, that it was doubtful
that 10b-5 allows a corporation a right of action arising out of a transaction
to which it is not a party. In brief, the corporation must be a party to the
alleged injurious scheme. This requirement was ignored in Moore and passed
over in Symington. In those cases neither corporation was a party to the
scheme. In stating the "party" requirement the court cited Birnbaum and
102 383 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1967).
103 One of the plaintiff shareholders had tendered ten shares.
104 383 F.2d at 843.
105 283 F. Supp. 763 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
106 Because of dividend arrearage the preferred stockholders were entitled to elect
a majority of Allied's directors.
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Hoover, indicating that it regarded the purchaser-seller limitation applicable
in this area.
In Bound Brook Water Co. v. Jage, 107 the court gave expression to what
several of the above decisions left unsaid. The factual pattern was not unusual.
Middle Atlantic Utilities Company, some of its shareholders and a third cor-
poration solicited tenders by shareholders of Bound Brook. The tender offer
allegedly contained various material misrepresentations and omissions con-
cerning the affairs of Bound Brook, the value of its stock and the competency
of its management. Bound Brook and several of its shareholders countered with
an action alleging violation of 10(b) and 10b-5, and sought to have the pur-
chases of Bound Brook shares declared void. Defendants argued that neither the
corporation nor its non-selling shareholders had standing to sue. The court
interpreted Vine as holding not that a non-selling shareholder had standing
but that in certain situations the normal meanings of purchaser and seller
will not control. The court noted that in Genesco and Pappas the non-selling
or non-purchasing shareholder was held to have standing to sue, but dis-
tinguished these cases on the ground that there the alleged fraudulent conduct
was perpetrated by insiders in control of the corporation, whereas here it was
perpetrated by outsiders. The relevance of this distinction is not expressly
stated. Perhaps the court feared that a "flood of litigation" would result if it
were to hold that "a non-selling or non-purchasing stockholder has a right
to sue under Rule 1Ob-5 every time there was a sale of some stock of his
corporation in the course of which certain facts were disclosed or omitted
which he felt impinged upon a fair transfer of that stock."I°s Neither a cor-
poration nor its shareholders, according to the court, has any interest per se
in the sale of stock by one of its shareholders to a third party. The court
indicated that, although it would not be bound by a strict purchaser-seller re-
quirement, the plaintiff still must show an interest in the alleged violative
conduct. In dismissing plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state a claim, how-
ever, the court indicated how a plaintiff might show such an interest. Plaintiff
must allege a violation of 10b-5 performed in connection with a transfer of
a security, damage to the plaintiff and a causal connection between that
damage and the violation. Plaintiffs here failed to meet the latter two require-
ments. Briefly, it is not every party that can have declared void a transfer of
a security which violates 10b-5. Only those damaged because of such transfer
have standing.
At the time of the Bound Brook decision another exploration of the
question of necessary interest was occurring in the Southern District of New
York. General Time Corporation brought an action against American In-
vestors Fund (Fund) and Talley Industries, seeking injunctive relief.' 09 Time
alleged that Talley and Fund, an investment company owning about 5 percent
of the outstanding stock of Talley, violated 10(b) and 10b-5 in purchasing
Time stock on the open market, in that they concealed from Time and its
shareholders material facts. The facts concealed were "that Talley intended
107 284 F. Supp. 702 (D.N.J. 1968).
108 Id. at 708.
109 General Time Corp. v. American Investors Fund, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 400 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
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to force a merger with Time, [and] that Talley and Fund were acting in
concert.""° Time did not allege that it purchased or sold any of its own
stock during the time of the alleged purchases by defendants, but attempted
to assert injury to itself by arguing that the acts and omissions of defendants
"created uncertainty as to the future course and conduct of plaintiff's busi-
ness, impeded and complicated plaintiff's plans for future operations and
adversely affected the morale of plaintiff's employees, all to the great damage
of plaintiff and its stockholders."'" In granting defendants' motion to dismiss
for want of standing to sue the court relied upon Allied for the proposition
that plaintiff corporation must have been a party to the transaction, and
indicated that the rationale as expressed in other cases has been that unless
the corporation is a party to the transaction there is no injury to the corpora-
tion. The court indicated that this requirement was especially applicable in
takeover cases because the incumbent management has no protected interest
in remaining in power. Control battles, according to the court, must be waged
in accordance with the securities laws, but the proper parties to enforce these
laws are those who bought or sold. 112
The court indicated that the alleged omissions and acts might injure
shareholders who sell. It is quite possible, of course, that disclosure of Talley's
plan to merge with Time would be welcome news to Time shareholders. In
such a case there would be no injury to anyone except Time management,
which has no protected interest. At any rate the court was of the opinion
that Time had failed to show injury. Defendants' conduct affects the share-
holders, and even if in the long run it did result in the merger and thus did
affect the corporation, the alleged intention to merge is not a wrong, according
to the court, about which Time can now complain. The court said nothing
about the alleged harmful side effects, i.e., uncertainty, poor employee morale
and impediment of plans. It is obvious that these are harmful to the corpora-
tion, but it is equally clear that they were not caused by the violation of
which plaintiff complained. The violation which plaintiff alleged was that the
defendants had concealed the plans for a merger. These injuries, it would
seem, grow out of knowledge of the merger plans and were thus not caused
by the alleged violation.
It would appear that Time is not a proper party to enforce the securities
laws because it has not shown any prospective injury to the corporation aris-
ing out of the alleged violations which would justify injunctive relief. In
neither Bound Brook nor Allied did the plaintiff successfully allege injury to
the corporation. These cases indicate that the courts are not disposed to allow
a corporation, either in a direct or derivative action, to demand that control
battles be fought according to the securities laws, unless the corporation can
allege irreparable injury arising out of the alleged violation.
Although the courts have had little trouble in finding that tender offers,
as instruments in control battles, are subject to regulation by 10(b) and
10b-5, this result was made explicit by a recent amendment to Section 14 of
110 Id. at 402.
111
 Id.
112 Id. at 403 & n.5.
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the Act of 1934,113 which became effective July 29, 1968, and by Rule 144-
1 (c) 114 promulgated July 30, 1968, implementing other recent additions to the
Act of 1934. It was expressly recognized in Electronic Specialty Co. [ELS] v.
International Controls Corp. [ICC]H5 that the amendment, section 14(e),
in substance makes 10(b) and 10b-5 applicable to tender offers. 116 Thus
notions of standing and the elements required to state a 14(e) or 14d-1(c)
claim will probably be adopted from the 10b-5 cases. Indeed, plaintiffs in
Specialty brought the action under 10(b), 10b-5 and 14(e). Plaintiffs were
ELS and two of its shareholders, one of whom had tendered his stock pursuant
to the ICC solicitation. The action, as the court recognized, was an attempt
by the management of ELS to halt an ICC takeover. 117 The presidents of
ELS and ICC had been carrying on considerable negotiations concerning a
merger of the two companies. Although this plan was abandoned, negotiations
continued concerning a sale by ICC to ELS of its holdings in ELS. After
these negotiations were terminated, ICC made a tender offer to ELS share-
holders. Plaintiffs brought an action seeking to enjoin defendant from carrying
out its tender offer.
The court recognized, correctly it would seem, that the provisions of
10(b) and 14(e) are "intended to offer protection to the persons to whom
the tender offer was addressed, i.e., the stockholders of ELS." 118 Despite the
fact that it recognized, therefore, that the issue was whether the tender offer
"misled those stockholders in order to induce them to sell their stock to
ICC,"119 the court expressly indicated that the corporation itself has standing
to sue.
Plaintiffs alleged that the tender offer was misleading in that ICC had
definite plans to merge with ELS, and further that such a plan would not
be advantageous to ELS shareholders. Plaintiffs argued, in this regard, and
the court agreed, that a statement in the tender offer of ICC that it would
consider a merger with ELS did not comply with 14d-1(c), which requires
that the offer describe plans for merger.
The court found further that plaintiffs might be successful in their
contention that defendant engaged in a manipulative device in contravention
of 14(e). Plaintiffs, in support of this contention, argued that defendant
113
 2 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. II 20,345. Section 14(e) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made,
not misleading, or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts
or practices, in connection with any tender offer or request or invitation for
tenders, or any solicitation of security holders in opposition to or in favor of
any such offer, request, or invitation.
114 Sec. Reg. 240.14d-1{c), 33 Fed. Reg. 11017 (1968), which provides that a tender
offer, when the offeror's purpose is to acquire control, must "describe any plans of [corn
proposals which the purchasers may have . . . to merge it [the company being acquired]
with any other persons. 
115 Current CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1[ 92,270 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 1968).
116 Id. at 97,303.
117 Id. at 97,305.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 97,306.
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deliberately tried to mislead the public into believing that ICC was about to
dump 100,000 shares of ELS on the market, and thereby depressed the price
of ELS stock. The purpose was to frighten ELS shareholders into accepting
ICC's tender offer.
Despite these findings, the court refused to grant an injunction which
would end the tender offer because of the possible harm to shareholders who
desired to sell, and who would lose out on the possible benefits of the tender
offer if the injunction were granted. Also, in denying the injunction, the court
felt that the harm to plaintiffs was not irreparable since, if they were success-
ful on the merits, they would be able to enjoin ICC from voting the stock
acquired by means of the tender offer. Furthermore, the court indicated that
the possibility of harm extended to all ELS shareholders, not merely to those
who sold. Perhaps the corporation was given standing because the court felt
that it was in the best position to protect all ELS shareholders. In such a
situation the central concern will be a balancing of prospective injury
against the possible harm which might result if the injunctive relief is granted.
CONCLUSION
In the individual shareholder actions the Birnbaum requirement seems
still to be viable as far as actions for damages are concerned. The courts
have been very willing to expand the concepts of purchaser and seller, how-
ever, where it is clear that the plaintiff has suffered damage as a result of a
violation of 10b-S. It has been suggested that the purchaser-seller require-
ment is needed to avoid the danger of speculative damages. 12° In this regard,
it should be noted that in the cases which have relaxed the requirement there
would seem to have been no danger of speculative damages. 121 It may be
expected that where there is a plain causal connection between the alleged
injury and a purchase or sale of securities induced by fraud the courts will
relax the purchaser-seller requirement. It is probable, furthermore, that this
readiness to afford a right of action where injury is apparent will lead to the
abandonment of the requirement. The only real barrier now existing to this
development is the judicial fear of a deluge of 10b-S claims where the dam-
ages alleged are highly speculative.
Where injunctive relief is sought this fear has already been overcome.
In Genesco the injunction was granted despite the fact that plaintiffs had not
sold. It is not unusual that the relief sought can be an indication of the likeli-
hood of success. As was pointed out in Genesco, the elements of a claim for
prophylactic relief need not be established as clearly as when the relief sought
is damages.' The injunction avoids the danger of speculative damages and
if viewed merely as a means of enforcing the securities rules, as the court in
120 1968 Utah L. Rev. 170, 178.
121 There is a danger of speculative damages where there has been no sale and thus
no solid basis for determining the actual damages. In the cases where the purchaser-
seller requirement has been expansively interpreted there is such a standard. In Vine and
Voege it is the price at which plaintiffs are "forced" to sell and in Fidelis it arguably is
the standard set up in the contract which provided that additional consideration was to
be determined by the earnings of Fidelis' assets.
122 Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 547 (2d Cir. 1967).
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Genesco seemed to view it, it becomes apparent why the necessity of alleging
reliance, deception and causation, as well as standing as a purchaser or seller,
is relaxed. There is no problem of recovery going to an undeserving plaintiff
who did not in fact rely on the alleged misstatement or omissions. Further,
where, as here, the injunction only forbids market manipulation, there is no
danger of harm to other shareholders, as there sometimes may be where the
purpose of the injunction is to halt a tender offer. Where the granting of an
injunction will cause no harm to those parties whom 10b-5 was intended to
protect and to other innocent parties, the policy of allowing other parties such
as the corporation or a shareholder to supplement the activity of the SEC
in enforcing the securities laws will further the intent of Congress to protect
the investing public.
The same considerations are applicable in the area of corporate or
derivative actions where plaintiffs are seeking to halt a change in corporate
control or schemes to perpetuate control. The possibility of successfully
meeting standing requirements in such actions is increasingly high. Where
the corporation seeks to halt an impending takeover by means of a fraudulent
tender offer, two problems, common where injunctive relief is sought, arise.
First, the corporation must show a potential injury; second, the necessity
for an injunction must be weighed against the possible injury which may
occur if the injunction is granted. In all probability if the corporation can
show a misleading tender offer which will allow those who would gain control
thereby to perpetrate alleged plans injurioueto the corporation the courts
will halt such a takeover, or at least enjoin the voting of shares to effect the
injurious plans. An allegation of a scheme or plan to injure may be necessary
in this regard.
In the area of derivative suits brought to redress injury to the corporation
the law is still in a confused state. In this area, as opposed to that of control
battles, the central concern has not been a failure to allege corporate injury.
In many cases the injury is clearly apparent. Nor have the courts in this area
been troubled by the purchaser-seller requirement. The corporation, when it
issues shares or exchanges or sells shares of another company, clearly meets
this requirement. For the most part the judicial hesitancy to afford a right
of action arises instead from the fact that, though the alleged violation involves
securities, the essence of the complaint is a violation of a fiduciary duty, which
has traditionally come within the realm of the state courts. The federal courts
recognize that the internal affairs of a corporation are an area of state interest.
However, in enacting the securities laws Congress has determined that in the
securities field there is a wide public interest best protected by federal legisla-
tion. Yet it is arguable that Congress did not intend that section 10(b) or
any rule promulgated under it regulate this entire field. Rather, the statute
and the Rule may be intended only to insure fairness in the act of creating or
dissolving ownership ties, and not to protect that ownership interest which
exists between these two events. In the cases in this area plaintiffs, though
they are enforcing a right of the corporation, are in reality seeking to employ
10b-5 to protect this interim interest. Of course this interest should be pro-
tected, but it is doubtful that 10b-5 was intended to afford this protection.
Nevertheless, the judicial barrier erected in this area to deny a right of action,
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the requirement of deception, has been eroded. If it is finally removed it will
constitute one more example of the federal judiciary filling a void created by
congressional and state inaction.
JOSEPH C. TANSKI
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